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ABSTRACT
Why do similar households end up with very different levels of wealth? We show that differences
in the attitudes and skills with which they approach financial planning are a significant factor. We use
new and unique survey data to assess these differences and to measure each household's "propensity to
plan.'' We show that those with a higher such propensity spend more time developing financial plans, and
that this shift in planning effort is associated with increased wealth. The propensity to plan is uncorrelated
with survey measures of the discount factor and the bequest motive, raising a question as to why it is
associated with wealth accumulation. Part of the answer lies in the very strong relationship we uncover
between the propensity to plan and how carefully households monitor their spending. It appears that this
detailed monitoring activity helps households to save more and to accumulate more wealth.
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According to the life cycle model, the central determinants of wealth accumulation are
age, household structure, lifetime earnings, and a relatively small set of preference pa-
rameters, such as the discount rate and the bequest motive. Yet recent empirical research
in the behavioral tradition suggests that other variables, with no explicit role in the life
cycle model, are strongly related to wealth accumulation. For example, Madrian and
Shea [2001] show that default rules in deﬁned contribution pension plans can have a
strong inﬂuence on wealth accumulation. Lusardi ([1999], [2000]) ﬁnds that households
who have given little thought to retirement have far lower wealth than those who have
given the subject more thought.
We view such empirical results as extremely provocative, but somewhat disconnected
from the main stream of research on life cycle saving. In large part, this separation is
a result of data limitations. While there are many data sets relevant to examination of
the life cycle model, available data typically include few variables of direct relevance to
testing behavioral hypotheses.
In this paper, we overcome these limitations using new data from two recent surveys,
both of which were completed by some 2,000 TIAA-CREF participant households. As
we describe in section 2 below, these surveys produced high quality data on household
portfolios of assets (both inside and outside of pension plans) and debts, and on lifetime
earnings proﬁles. In addition, following the pioneering work of Barsky, Juster, Kimball,
and Shapiro [1997] (henceforth BJKS), the surveys included questions designed to provide
measures of classical preference parameters, such as the discount factor. The surveys also
contained questions regarding household behavior related to ﬁnancial planning, as well
as questions intended to measure a variety individual and household behavioral and
psychological characteristics.
The main empirical results in this paper focus on the relationship between ﬁnancial
planning and wealth accumulation. Our ﬁrst set of ﬁndings conﬁrm and enrich Lusardi’s
earlier results: in section 3 we describe the robust positive relationship between ﬁnancial
planning and wealth accumulation. In section 4 we establish that the line of causation
runs from planning to wealth accumulation, rather than vice versa. We use a set of
nonﬁnancial survey questions to identify variation in the underlying “propensity to plan”
of the survey respondents. We construct our measure of the propensity to plan based on
survey questions in the nonﬁnancial arena that are correlated with ﬁnancial planning.
These questions were asked precisely to provide natural instruments for exploring the
direction of causation in the relationship between planning and wealth. We show that
1diﬀerences in planning eﬀort associated with variation in this propensity are in turn
strongly associated with diﬀerences in wealth accumulation.
Why are diﬀerences in the propensity to plan associated with diﬀerences in wealth
accumulation? In contrast with the results of Lusardi [2000], section 5 shows that diﬀer-
ential patterns of equity holding are not responsible for the connection between planning
and wealth accumulation. Rather, our ﬁndings suggest that planners save more. Section
6 explores whether or not the connection between ﬁnancial planning and wealth accu-
mulation is due to a correlation with measures of classical preference parameters, such
as the discount factor. We ﬁnd no evidence to support this hypothesis.
If diﬀerences in the propensity to plan are unrelated to diﬀerences in the discount
factor, why are they associated with diﬀerences in wealth accumulation and savings? The
following simple story suggests one possible explanation:
A close friend of the authors was recently surprised to ﬁnd that the size of
his bank account had declined dramatically over the last year. To understand
how this could have happened, he carefully reviewed his spending, and was
shocked at how much money seemed to have dissipated in various directions.
To ensure that this pattern did not repeat itself, he resolved to keep a closer
watch on his day-to-day spending. The end result was an increase in savings.
If this is not an isolated case, it suggests there may be a link between how closely one
monitors one’s spending and the level of savings. If in addition there is a high correlation
between such monitoring behaviors and the propensity to plan, then this could provide an
intuitive explanation for our ﬁndings. The survey results presented in section 7 suggest
that this may indeed be an important line of explanation.
The larger goal of our research project is to dig deeper into what determines indi-
vidual diﬀerences in wealth accumulation. Currently, “the discount factor” stands in as
a convenient mathematical representation for most of these diﬀerences. Useful as this
abstraction may be for certain purposes, it does not provide much in the way of guidance
to policymakers. Yet if savings and wealth accumulation are indeed impacted by shifts
in the propensity to plan, this suggests entirely new mechanisms by which to encourage
saving. Do the high school curriculum mandates analyzed by Bernheim, Garret, and
Maki [1997] impact the propensity to plan? Does this explain their apparent impact
on the savings rate? Are there alternative policies that may be even more eﬀective at
impacting the propensity to plan and the savings rate?
22 The Survey and the Sample
2.1 The Sample
The data used in this paper are drawn from two surveys sent to a sample of TIAA-CREF
participants: the Survey of Participant Finances, ﬁelded in January 2000 (henceforth
SPF), and the Survey of Financial Attitudes and Behavior (henceforth FAB), ﬁelded in
January 2001. The SPF was designed to examine in detail the type and the amount of
ﬁnancial assets owned by a large group of TIAA-CREF participants. The FAB explored
these participants’ ﬁnancial preferences, expectations, and attitudes. The survey sam-
ples are not representative of the TIAA-CREF population. The sampling procedure is
described in greater detail in a companion paper on retirement consumption (Ameriks,
Caplin, and Leahy [2002]).
The surveys address many aspects of wealth accumulation. In this paper, we focus
attention on wealth accumulation during the accumulation phase of the life cycle. We
consider households to be in this phase if neither the respondent, nor partner if applicable,
are at or above 65 years of age.1 Of the 2,064 households who ﬁlled out the FAB, 1,191
satisﬁed this criterion, and they make up the under-65 universe from which all other
samples discussed in the paper are drawn. Note that because early retirement may itself
be a consequence of planning-related shifts in wealth, we do not restrict our universe to
those who are currently working.
In most of the statistical analysis and regressions in this paper, we limit attention
to a subsample of our universe that supplied complete data on all variables of interest.
As a ﬁrst step in ensuring data completeness, we remove all households receiving life-
annuity income from TIAA-CREF from the sample, simply because it is not clear how to
interpret the TIAA-CREF asset values reported by annuitants. Of the 1,067 remaining
households in the under-65 universe, 513 supplied complete data and could be included in
the regression analysis. Of these, we remove from the regression analysis an additional 10
with nonpositive net worth, and 3 extreme outliers with more than $5 million in ﬁnancial
assets. We refer to the 500 remaining households as the regression sample.
1While respondents always reported their own age, there was a high nonresponse rate for year of birth






Characteristic (n) (%) (n) (%)
Age
Below 35 120 10.1 61 12.2
35-39 109 9.2 58 11.6
40-44 110 9.2 61 12.2
45-49 173 14.5 82 16.4
50-54 244 20.5 106 21.2
55-59 215 18.1 70 14.0
60-64 220 18.5 62 12.4
Gender
Female 550 46.2 205 41.0
Male 641 53.8 295 59.0
Marital Status
Curr. married 777 65.2 332 66.4
Prev. married 193 16.2 61 12.2
Never married 221 18.6 107 21.4
Education
College or below 342 28.7 128 25.6
Masters or Prof. 466 39.1 206 41.2
Ph.D. 383 32.2 166 33.2
Occupation
Teaching faculty 397 33.3 162 32.4
Mgmt., Sen. Admn. 249 20.9 103 20.6
Other Tech./Prof. 304 25.5 150 30.0
Other 231 19.4 85 17.0
Num. children
0 747 62.7 303 60.6
1 162 13.6 66 13.2
2 205 17.2 96 19.2
3 77 6.5 35 7.0
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2000 SPF and 2001 FAB survey data.
Notes: The “under 65 universe” is all respondents to the FAB survey who were
under age 65 and, if applicable and available, whose spouse reported an age of
less than 65 (1,191 respondents/households). Some respondents in this sample
did not report data for all the above characteristics. The “regression sample”
is all individuals in the under 65 universe who: (1) provided complete informa-
tion regarding the demographic characteristics above, (2) provided complete
information regarding their household’s net worth, (3) provided complete in-
formation on their past, present, and expected future labor earnings, (4) have
no life annuity income from TIAA-CREF, (5) have positive net worth, and (6)
have less than $5 million in gross ﬁnancial assets.
42.2 Basic Demographic and Economic Variables
Table 1 shows the basic demographic characteristics of households in both the under-
65 universe and in the regression sample. We tabulate answers to questions concerning
the respondent’s gender, marital status (married, never married, previously married),
number of dependent children, and age. We also tabulate educational and occupational
characteristics.
It is clear from the table that our sample is far from representative. In particular, re-
spondents are extremely well-educated: the vast majority completed college, and roughly
1 in 3 have Ph.Ds. In terms of employment, roughly 1 in 3 are teaching faculty, with
the majority of the others having management or professional positions. The “other”
employment category corresponds to secretarial, maintenance, and other support posi-
tions. Finally, note that there appears to be little diﬀerence between the working and the
regression samples in terms of most demographic characteristics, although the regression
sample is somewhat younger and contains fewer who are widowed or divorced, possibly
due to the removal of annuitants.
Table 2 summarizes households’ economic characteristics. Data on earnings is from
the FAB in which we asked households to provide estimates of their overall taxable income
from employment in 1999.2 The asset and debt information is drawn from the SPF. We
record not only the total level of wealth, but also the division between retirement assets
and nonretirement assets. Within the nonretirement assets, we separate out real estate
wealth, which comprises both owner-occupied and investment assets. With regard to
debt, we distinguish between mortgage debt, and all other forms of debt, including credit
card and educational debts.
In Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2002] we compare characteristics of our sample with
those of working households in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Net worth
is some 2.5–3 times higher in our sample, while debt levels are generally lower. There is
also far greater homogeneity in our sample than in the SCF. In contrast with the SCF,
the vast majority of households in our sample have signiﬁcant nonretirement ﬁnancial
assets, and very few have high levels of personal debt.
2We use 1999 income from the FAB, since this corresponds most closely to the wealth data from the
SPF.
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Financial and Earnings Data for Surveyed Households
Mean Median Std. Dev. # Obs.
Sample and measure ($000) ($000) ($000) (N)
Under 65 universe∗
Net worth 705 379 933 671
Gross ﬁnancial assets 575 270 1,004 735
Ret. ﬁn. assets 424 210 795 885
Non-ret. ﬁn. assets 188 45 427 938
Real estate assets 250 160 530 1,145
Total debt 89 55 275 1,048
Mortgage debt 79 46 259 1,124
Personal debt 8 0 51 1,089
1998 Employment income 77 67 62 1,133
1999 Employment income 81 70 68 1,144
Expected 2005 emp. income 87 75 82 1,015
Regression sample∗∗
Net worth 700 394 810 500
Gross ﬁnancial assets 555 306 661 500
Ret. ﬁn. assets 390 216 450 500
Non-ret. ﬁn. assets 165 44 308 500
Real estate assets 230 153 319 500
Total debt 85 60 106 500
Mortgage debt 79 50 104 500
Personal debt 6 0 12 500
1998 Employment income 81 68 62 500
1999 Employment income 85 72 67 500
Expected 2005 emp. income 93 80 80 500
Source: Authors’ tabulation of 2000 and 2001 survey data.
Notes: “Gross ﬁnancial assets” is the sum of all retirement account balances, mutual funds (except real estate
mutual funds), directly held stocks, directly held bonds, checking accounts, savings accounts, and CDs. “Net
worth” is total assets minus mortgage debt, outstanding educational loans, outstanding personal loans, and
credit card balances. All aggregates exclude the value of real estate mutual funds, whole life insurance policies,
trusts, and educational savings accounts (Education IRAs and 529 plans). Respondents were instructed to
provide values as of December 31, 1999. Note these data include only the information reported by respondents
on the surveys, and may therefore diﬀer from data reported in Ameriks, Caplin & Leahy (2002).
*For the under 65 universe, statistics are tabulated for all individuals who provided complete data for each
individual item (in each row). The number of observations in each row varies, as item response varies.
**The “regression sample” members are the 500 individuals in the under 65 universe who: (1) provided
complete information regarding the demographic characteristics in Table 1 above, (2) provided complete
information regarding their household’s net worth, (3) provided complete information on their past, present,
and expected future labor earnings, (4) have no life annuity income from TIAA-CREF, (5) have positive net
worth, and (6) have less than $5 million in gross ﬁnancial assets.
2.3 Data Quality
We believe our data on portfolios of assets and debts to be of high quality. For example,
our survey requests a quantitative division of assets in deﬁned contribution retirement
plans into separate classes, such as cash and equities. In contrast, for example, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board’s triennial Surveys of Consumer Finances do not ask households to
6provide numerical information on the breakdown of retirement assets into diﬀerent asset
classes. Rather, respondents provide qualitative answers; any numerical data on portfolio
shares derived from the data must be obtained using additional assumptions concerning
the interpretation of these qualitative answers. The survey separates employer-sponsored
TIAA-CREF accounts from all other retirement assets (which are themselves broken
down into other sub-categories) and from nonretirement assets. Within each such cate-
gory we asked for a precise quantitative breakdown describing how much of the total was
held in various diﬀerent forms. At a minimum, these breakdowns were designed to allow
us to discriminate between cash assets, ﬁxed income assets, equities, and other assets.
We also asked comprehensive numerical questions concerning real estate assets, and all
forms of debt. Where relevant, we asked for information on the assets of the respondent’s
spouse or partner.
Our response rates were generally very high; well in excess of 90% for most of the
larger asset categories. We also had high response rates on the breakdown of these assets
among diﬀerent types of investment instruments. As indicated in table 2, when we look
across all of these responses and insist on having suﬃcient information to calculate net
worth, we retain 671 of the 1,191 households in the under-65 universe.
Asking quantitative questions and getting quantitative answers is not by itself an
assurance of high data quality. Greater assurance of accuracy can be found by compar-
ing one of our self-reported data items against accounting records. We have appended
accounting information from TIAA-CREF to the survey responses of all respondents
with retirement assets at TIAA-CREF.3 Yet before comparing the self-reports and the
accounting data, we must take account of two important points of diﬀerence between the
two types of data. The ﬁrst issue involves the treatment of individual IRAs. In the SPF,
we asked respondents to report the total of their TIAA-CREF employer-sponsored re-
tirement assets, and separately to record all (both TIAA-CREF and non-TIAA-CREF)
of their individual IRA holdings. In contrast, the TIAA-CREF data we use combine
TIAA-CREF assets in employer-sponsored plans with some types of TIAA-CREF IRAs
that the individual may hold, making it inappropriate for us to compare the reported
employer-sponsored plan total with this data. A second important diﬀerence arises in
cases in which both the respondent and the respondent’s partner have TIAA-CREF as-
sets. In these cases, the survey may have been ﬁlled in by the partner rather than by the
addressee, breaking the connection between the self-reports and the accounting records.
3The anonymity and conﬁdentiality of the survey respondents has been, and continues to be, strictly
enforced and maintained. The identities of speciﬁc respondents remain unknown to all of the investiga-
tors.
7Both of these issues must be addressed before it is valid to compare the two sources of
data.
With respect to the treatment of IRAs, the accounting data include an indicator of
the existence of the problematic IRA accounts. Before comparing the self-reports and
accounting numbers, we condition on the individual who responded to the survey having
no IRAs, since this condition is necessary for the two numbers to coincide. With respect
to households in which both partners have TIAA-CREF assets, we restrict attention to
those for whom data on the age and gender of the respondent agree with those from the
corresponding accounting record. With these issues handled, table 3 reports results of
a log-log regression of the reported TIAA-CREF asset totals on the accounting totals
for the 738 sample households for whom the comparison is relevant, and whose records
and self-reports indicated at least $10,000 in TIAA-CREF retirement assets. (We asked
respondents to report amounts in thousands; the “greater than $10,000” rule is applied
to reduce the inﬂuence of rounding errors.)
Table 3
OLS Regression:
Reported TIAA-CREF Assets on Accounting Data
Sample & RHS Variables Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Pr > |t|
Under 65 universe
ln(TCData) 0.992 0.006 0.000
Constant -0.006 0.032 0.859
Regression sample
ln(TCData) 0.997 0.009 0.000
Constant -0.014 0.047 0.761
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2001 survey data and 1999 accounting data.
Note: This is a log-log regression of respondent’s report of the value of his or her
TIAA-CREF assets on actual accounting data for the respondent. For both the
under 65 universe and the regression sample, the data include only those who
reported and had more than $10,000 in TIAA-CREF assets, with no immediate
(payout) annuities, or TIAA-CREF IRAs, and whose reported age and gender
matched the age and gender recorded in the TIAA-CREF database. For the
universe, 738 observations are included in this regression; the R2 is .958; root
MSE is 0.247. For the regression sample, 381 observations are included, the R2
is .968; root MSE is 0.214.
The coeﬃcient on the TIAA-CREF accounting data is extremely close to 1, while the
constant term is statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting a very high correlation between
the self-reports and the accounting data. The average absolute deviation between the
response and the accounting data is on the order of 10%, while the median is less than
2%. We note that Gustman and Steinmeier [2001] document far larger discrepancies
between the pension beneﬁts reported by respondents to the HRS and a careful estimate
8of the beneﬁts that these same respondents have accumulated based on administrative
records.
In the regressions that follow, unless otherwise indicated, we calculate net worth and
gross ﬁnancial assets using self-reported data for all asset categories, including TIAA-
CREF assets. We report also in section 4 on the results of regressions in which we replace
self-reported TIAA-CREF asset total with accounting data (and in which we restrict the
sample to avoid the obvious cases described above in which the TIAA-CREF data is
likely to be inappropriate). In the context of that analysis, we provide a more detailed
discussion of the various possible reasons for diﬀerences between the accounting data and
the self-reports.
3 Wealth and Planning: the Correlation
3.1 Prior Literature
A basic assumption in the life cycle model is that households form complete contingent
plans prescribing consumption and asset holdings in all possible states of nature. Yet
there is survey evidence suggesting that this is very far from accurate. Using data from the
Retirement Conﬁdence Survey, Yakoboski and Dickemper [1997] document a pervasive
lack of planning for retirement. They ﬁnd that only 36% of current workers in their survey
have tried to determine how much they need to save to fund a comfortable retirement.
They also report that 37% of current workers report having given little or no thought to
their retirement.
If one translates the notion of poor planning into the language of the life cycle model,
it presumably corresponds to greater uncertainty about the level of consumption implied
by diﬀerent states of nature. If anything, one might expect such an increased uncertainty
to give rise to an increase in wealth accumulation, especially for households for whom
the precautionary motive is large. Yet Lusardi [1999], using data from the Health and
Retirement Survey (HRS), found that those who have given “little or no” thought to
retirement have ﬁnancial wealth signiﬁcantly lower than those who have given the subject
more thought, even when one controls for the usual suspects in the life cycle model, such
as age and lifetime income. Of course this does not answer the question of causation:
maybe it is wealth that drives thinking about retirement rather than vice versa. It is this
subject that is addressed in Lusardi [2000], and to which we turn our sights in the next
section.
In the remainder of this section, we explore whether or not our data indicate a con-
9nection between ﬁnancial planning activities and wealth accumulation. In contrast with
HRS households, our households generally appear to have done signiﬁcant amounts of
ﬁnancial planning, as described in the next section. In addition, our households are
relatively homogeneous, wealthy, and well-educated. Despite these diﬀerences, it turns
out that Lusardi’s insight generalizes: ﬁnancial planning and wealth accumulation are
strongly positively correlated.
3.2 Deﬁning Financial Planning
Clearly, the HRS question concerning “thinking about retirement” is unsatisfactory, since
it makes no direct mention of ﬁnancial planning per se. To highlight this topic, we
posed our questions at the very beginning of the survey, and they were preceded by the
statement:
We are interested in your behavior related to planning for your household’s
long-term ﬁnancial future, and the types of advice (if any) you may have used
in developing your ﬁnancial plan.
How best to measure ﬁnancial planning? At this exploratory stage we do not know
precisely how planning is supposed to inﬂuence wealth, nor do we know what constitutes
an eﬀective form of planning. Absent such a complete model, we focus our attention on
two diﬀerent approaches to measurement, based respectively on the input and output
sides of the planning activity. With respect to the input side, we believe that most
people have a sense of when they are and when they are not engaged in ﬁnancial planning
activities. We asked survey participants to respond to the following general statement:
• Question 1a: I have spent a great deal of time developing a ﬁnancial plan.
Answers to this question and to many other questions on the survey were placed on a
qualitative 1-6 scale. Survey participants were asked to indicate which of six statements
(1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree, 3 = disagree somewhat, 4 = agree somewhat, 5 =
agree, 6 = agree strongly) best characterized their reaction to the statement.
Turning to the output side, it seems clear that one of the essential outputs of the
planning activity is a well-articulated ﬁnancial plan. Hence we asked households a yes/no
question concerning their preparation of just such a clearly deﬁned plan.
• Question 2a: Have you personally gathered together your household’s ﬁnancial
information, reviewed it in detail, and formulated a speciﬁc ﬁnancial plan for your
household’s long term future? [yes/no]
10For those who say yes to this question, we ask them also to specify the age at which this
activity was ﬁrst undertaken, since one might expect the impact of planning on wealth to
depend on how long one has had that plan in place. In regressions based on this second
measure, we include both an indicator for whether or not a plan has been developed, and
a measure of the time for which any such plan has been in place.
Answers to questions 1a and 2a are presented in table 4, which shows that the majority
of respondents agreed (to some degree) that they had spent a great deal of time developing
a ﬁnancial plan, and at the same time claimed to have put together just such a detailed
plan: the correlation between these two measures of planning in our regression sample is
0.48. In self description, our sample is far more involved with long term planning than
are their counterparts in the HRS, where only one-third of respondents claim to have
given a lot of thought to retirement, even though all of them are within ten years of
retiring (Lusardi [1999]).
Table 4
Responses to Basic Planning Questions
among Regression Sample Members
Q2a Response
Has No
Detailed plan Detailed Plan Total
Q1a Response (n) (%) (n) (%) (n) (%)
Disagree strongly 3 0.8 9 6.7 12 2.4
Disagree 28 7.7 47 35.1 75 15.0
Disagree somewhat 40 11.0 35 26.1 75 15.0
Agree somewhat 152 41.6 38 28.4 190 38.1
Agree 105 28.8 4 3.0 109 21.8
Agree strongly 37 10.1 1 0.7 38 7.6
Total 365 100.0 134 100.0 499 100.0
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2001 FAB survey data.
Note: One individual in the regression sample did not respond to the detailed planning
question (Q2a).
One point to note about our questions is that while they measure strictly personal
characteristics, we will use them in regressions for household wealth. To assess the
importance of this distinction, we asked two questions on the survey designed to gauge
the importance of the respondent in household ﬁnancial and spending decisions.
• Question 3h: I take the lead in making investment decisions in my household.
• Question 3o: I take the lead in making discretionary spending decisions in my
household.
11Both questions were answered on the 1-6 scale. Most respondents do appear to play
a very signiﬁcant role in household ﬁnancial decision-making: almost 90% responding
aﬃrmatively to question 3h, and roughly 75% to question 3o. Indeed a high level of
ﬁnancial responsibility may have been viewed by responding households as an important
determinant of who should ﬁll out the questionnaire. In statistical terms, the end result is
that our ﬁndings are changed only minimally if we condition on the answers to questions
3h and 3o exceeding some cutoﬀ value. We conclude that our results are not signiﬁcantly
impacted by the respondent-household distinction.
3.3 Results
Table 5 presents our basic regressions of net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets on planning
and a set of variables familiar from standard life cycle regressions, including gender,
marital status, and number of children. We use information on income in 1998 and
expected income from 2005 along with age and income in 1999 to control for the life-
cycle pattern of earnings. Natural logarithms of the income measures are used in the
regressions; for respondents reporting zero income, the log measure is given a value of 0,
and a corresponding dummy variable is set to 1. We include a separate set of dummies
for household retirement status (working, semi-retired, fully retired). We use age and age
squared to control for the humped-shaped pattern of wealth accumulation. Education and
occupation are also included to provide additional controls for past and future income.
Finally, since deﬁned contribution pensions are included in our measure of wealth, but
deﬁned beneﬁt pensions are not, we include a dummy for households reporting one or
more deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. In what follows we refer to this set of variables as
“the controls.”
12Table 5
Basic OLS Wealth Regression Results
Net Worth Gross Financial Assets
Variable Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t| Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t|
Planning variable 0.160*** 0.035 0.000 0.186*** 0.035 0.000
Log 1999 income 0.319** 0.160 0.046 0.371** 0.163 0.024
Zero 1999 income 1.860** 0.815 0.023 2.234*** 0.833 0.008
Log past income 0.248 0.156 0.114 0.207 0.160 0.196
Zero past income 0.616 0.885 0.486 -0.209 0.905 0.817
Log future income 0.061 0.093 0.512 0.099 0.095 0.300
Zero future income 0.392 0.418 0.349 0.502 0.428 0.241
Age 0.211*** 0.048 0.000 0.177*** 0.049 0.000
Age2 -0.001*** 0.001 0.005 -0.001** 0.001 0.037
Empl. status
Working Omitted Omitted
Partially retired 0.174 0.198 0.382 0.300 0.203 0.140
Retired 0.327 0.265 0.217 0.330 0.271 0.224
Occupation
Faculty Omitted Omitted
Mgmt./Sen. Admin. -0.111 0.120 0.357 -0.135 0.123 0.271
Tech./Professional 0.079 0.112 0.481 0.067 0.115 0.558
Other -0.112 0.136 0.409 -0.152 0.139 0.276
Education
College or below -0.197* 0.111 0.076 -0.337*** 0.113 0.003
M.A./Profesional Omitted Omitted
Ph.D. -0.158 0.099 0.112 -0.159 0.102 0.117
R. has DB plan -0.138 0.100 0.170 -0.235** 0.103 0.023
S. has DB plan -0.124 0.123 0.314 -0.246* 0.126 0.052
Marital status
Curr. married Omitted Omitted
Prev. married -0.511*** 0.144 0.000 -0.504*** 0.147 0.001
Never married -0.299** 0.128 0.020 -0.184 0.131 0.159
Male respondent -0.010 0.090 0.912 0.067 0.092 0.462
Num. kids 0.044 0.047 0.351 0.018 0.048 0.706




Pr> F 0.000 0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2000 & 2001 survey data.
Note: Dependent variables are natural logarithms of the quantities listed at head of each set
of columns. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical conﬁdence for rejection of the hypothesis
that the relevant coeﬃcient is (independently) equal to zero: “***” indicates rejection at
better than a 1% level of conﬁdence, “**” indicates rejection at better than a 5% level, and
“*” indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
13Our central ﬁnding is that the correlation of planning with both net worth and gross
ﬁnancial assets is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant. With respect to the eco-
nomic signiﬁcance of the correlation with planning, the standard deviation of the answer
to question 1a in this sample is around 1.2. Given the coeﬃcients on question 1a in
table 5, this implies that a one standard deviation increase in the answer to the planning
question is associated with roughly a 20% increase in net worth and in gross ﬁnancial
assets. The eﬀect of planning survives when we change from input to output measure of
planning. When we use the answers from question 2a in place of the input-based measure
of question 1a, we ﬁnd that both having a plan and having that plan in place for a longer
time are associated with higher net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets.4 The test that both
coeﬃcients are zero is deﬁnitively rejected. Explaining these eﬀects is the goal of the
remainder of the paper.
With respect to key life cycle variables, the regression coeﬃcients in table 5 are
generally similar across the two regressions, and consistent with the classical model of
life cycle saving. Both net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets are increasing and concave
in age, increasing in current and past income, and little impacted by future income.
As expected, possessing a deﬁned beneﬁt plan tends to reduce wealth accumulation.
The demographic controls, including the education and occupation dummies, tend to
be insigniﬁcant, with the notable exception of being single, divorced, or widowed, all of
which are associated with less wealth accumulation than being married.5
4 Financial Planning and Wealth
4.1 A Question of Causation
As discussed above, establishing a correlation is relatively uninteresting if the line of
causation runs from high wealth to high levels of planning. Hence it is natural to search
for instruments. Lusardi [2000] searches for such instruments in the HRS, and makes
ingenious use of a number of variables that are descriptive of family structure, such as
the number and age of one’s older siblings, as well as variables related to parental health
4For brevity, we do not provide a full report of these regressions. The results of all regressions that
we summarize in the text but do not fully report are available from the authors upon request.
5While the coeﬃcients in these wealth regressions are not unusual, the high degree of explanatory
power certainly is. Even when we remove planning, we get R2’s of above 50% in both regressions. In
contrast, wealth regressions in the HRS typically get R2’s below 10% (e.g. Lusardi [1999] and Bernheim,
Skinner, and Weinberg [2001]. A small part of this is due to diﬀerences in sample deﬁnition (e.g. the
HRS focuses only on households close to retirement). However the lion’s share of the diﬀerence appears
to be due to other distinctions between the data sets, in particular the fact that we have more wealthy
individuals in our sample. It is also likely that our sample is more homogeneous in the omitted variables.
14outcomes in old age. Her idea is that their example and experience may promote atten-
tion to retirement by a younger family member. Seeing an older sibling who arrived at
retirement with inadequate preparation may provide a powerful incentive for the younger
sibling to begin thinking about retirement at a younger age.
The results of her IV procedures are somewhat mixed, but broadly supportive of the
idea that causation runs from planning to wealth accumulation. Yet the instruments are
not entirely appealing at the theoretical level. Any family structure variable or family
health variable may be connected to wealth accumulation through any number of diﬀerent
channels, depending on the nature of the family connections. An individual with far older
siblings or sick parents may as a result be subject to current and possible future expenses,
and may also anticipate receiving a relatively small inheritance.
The fact that the HRS does not contain natural instruments for investigating the
relationship between wealth and planning should not be surprising, since this issue was
not central to the design of the survey. In contrast, this issue was absolutely central in
our survey design. The end result is that we choose follow an entirely diﬀerent approach
to sorting out issues of causation than did Lusardi. Rather than looking for exogenous
life events to shift planning, our approach is to focus on personal characteristics. We
search for characteristics that are likely to be correlated with high levels of ﬁnancial
planning, and then attempt to ensure that any other correlation that they may have with
wealth accumulation is already accounted for by our data on income and demographic
characteristics.
4.2 Measuring the Propensity to Plan
What hypotheses are available to guide the design of our instruments for ﬁnancial plan-
ning? Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that there are some individuals who are globally more
inclined than others to plan. Question 3d was designed to measure this general propen-
sity. We chose to ask a question about vacation planning, because it is a situation in
which planning is important, without being obviously connected either with ﬁnancial
planning per se, or with broad measures of patience such as the discount factor. As with
all of the planning questions, the answers were on the 1-6 scale from disagree strongly to
agree strongly.
• Question 3d: Before going on a vacation, I spend a great deal of time examining
where I would most like to go and what I would like to do.
Our second hypothesis takes the planning characteristic idea one step further. We
hypothesize that the propensity to plan involves a somewhat broader desire for order and
15understanding. Question 3s was designed to measure this kind of fastidiousness.
• Question 3s: My workspace is generally very tidy.
Our third and ﬁnal hypothesis concerns the speciﬁc mental processes required to
construct a ﬁnancial plan. More than other forms of planning, ﬁnancial planning calls
for speciﬁc skills in the area of numeracy. A ﬁnancial plan may be far easier to construct
for one who is highly numerate than for one who has few technical skills. Questions 3e
and 3q were designed to capture this hypothesis.
• Question 3e: I am highly conﬁdent in my computer skills.
• Question 3q: I am highly conﬁdent in my mathematical skills.
The questions concerning a tidy workspace and computer skills are not signiﬁcantly
correlated with planning, either individually or jointly. They are therefore dropped as in-
struments. Fortunately, the vacation planning and mathematical skills questions turn out
to be very strongly connected to planning, and are used as instruments in the remainder
of the paper. We recognize that there is a potential correlation between mathematical
ability and income, and therefore include a number controls for income in our regres-
sions, in an attempt to soak up any eﬀect of math ability on wealth through income.
The correlation between vacation planning and income is statistically insigniﬁcant. We
discuss further the validity of our instruments after presenting the results.
4.3 IV Regressions: First stage
Table 6 presents the ﬁrst stage results of our two-stage least squares regression of net
worth and gross ﬁnancial assets on planning and controls. Both of the instruments are
signiﬁcantly correlated with planning. The F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the
instruments is in excess of 13, and the hypothesis that both instruments are zero is
rejected at the .0001 level.
16Table 6
First-stage Planning/Wealth Regression Results
Regression sample
Variable Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t|
Vacation planning 0.166*** 0.043 0.000
Math conﬁdence 0.150*** 0.044 0.001
Log 1999 income 0.138 0.207 0.504
Zero 1999 income 0.839 1.052 0.425
Log past income 0.249 0.202 0.218
Zero past income 2.058* 1.140 0.072
Log future income -0.151 0.120 0.210
Zero future income -0.601 0.541 0.267
Age -0.181*** 0.062 0.003
Age2 0.002*** 0.001 0.005
Empl. status
Working Omitted
Partially retired 0.506** 0.256 0.049
Retired 0.293 0.342 0.392
Occupation
Faculty Omitted
Mgmt./Sen. Admin. 0.017 0.156 0.914
Tech./Professional -0.067 0.145 0.642
Other 0.087 0.176 0.620
Education
College or below 0.073 0.143 0.613
M.A./Profesional Omitted
Ph.D. -0.050 0.129 0.699
R. has DB plan 0.050 0.130 0.698
S. has DB plan 0.150 0.160 0.349
Marital status
Curr. married Omitted
Prev. married -0.117 0.186 0.529
Never married -0.173 0.165 0.296
Male respondent 0.011 0.116 0.926
Num. kids -0.065 0.061 0.283





Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2000 & 2001 survey data.
Note: Dependent variable in the regression above is the answer to Question
1a, degree of agreement (1=Disagree strongly, 2=Disagree, 3=Disagree some-
what, 4=Agree somewhat, 5=Agree, 6=Agree strongly) with the statement
“I have spent a great deal of time developing a ﬁnancial plan.” Asterisks
indicate the level of statistical conﬁdence for rejection of the hypothesis that
the relevant coeﬃcient is (independently) equal to zero: “***” indicates re-
jection at better than a 1% level of conﬁdence, “**” indicates rejection at
better than a 5% level, and “*” indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
174.4 The IV Regressions: Second stage
Table 7 presents the second-stage results for both regressions. In neither case do we
reject the overidentifying restrictions at the 5% level (8% for net worth, 12% for gross
ﬁnancial assets).
The coeﬃcients are fairly close to their OLS values, with the notable exception of
the coeﬃcients on planning, which are larger and still statistically signiﬁcant.6 With
respect to their economic signiﬁcance, note that the standard deviation of the answers
to question 3d on vacation planning is around 1.2, similar to that for question 3q. This
means that a one standard deviation increase in either answer is associated roughly with
a 0.2 increase in the level of planning, and therefore with a 6.5% increase in net worth
and an 8% increase in gross ﬁnancial assets. More broadly, the standard deviation of
instrumented planning in the sample is 0.455, so that a one standard deviation change
in its level is associated with increases of roughly 15% in net worth and an 18% in gross
ﬁnancial assets.
The broad result is unchanged when we replace question 1a with question 2a as
the measure of planning. The joint eﬀects on net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets of
having made a comprehensive plan and having that plan in place for a number of years
are positive for the vast majority of the sample. In both the net worth and the gross
ﬁnancial assets regressions, the test that both coeﬃcients are zero is rejected at the 5%
level.
In his discussion of Lusardi, Gale [1999] raises important questions concerning the
economic as opposed to the statistical signiﬁcance of her ﬁndings. One of the issues he
raised is that for the households in the HRS, unmeasured social security wealth is the
dominant source of retirement income. Since this is largely independent of planning, the
planning eﬀect is correspondingly less important as a source of reduced consumption.
This objection is far less powerful for our sample, for whom social security income forms
a far smaller share of total retirement income. Gale’s second question concerns whether
Lusardi’s eﬀects, large as they may be in percentage terms, may nevertheless be very small
in dollar terms. This would be true if the eﬀect of planning was signiﬁcant only for those
with low levels of wealth. However, when we repeat our net worth IV-regression for the
300 households in the regression sample with net worth between $50,000 and $750,000,
the coeﬃcient on instrumented planning rises to .40, signiﬁcant at the 2% level. When
we do likewise for the gross asset IV-regression for the 315 sample households with gross
6The increase in the coeﬃcient on planning when we instrument is supportive of the view that
exogenous increases in wealth reduce planning. However we cannot reject the alternative interpretation
that instrumenting simply reduces measurement error in planning.
18ﬁnancial assets between $50,000 and $750,000, the coeﬃcient on instrumented planning
falls slightly to .363, signiﬁcant at the 3% level.
Table 7
Second-stage Planning/Wealth Regression Results
Net Worth Gross Financial Assets
Variable Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t| Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t|
Planning variable (IV) 0.324** 0.154 0.035 0.398** 0.159 0.013
Log 1999 income 0.304* 0.164 0.065 0.351** 0.170 0.040
Zero 1999 income 1.724** 0.843 0.041 2.059** 0.873 0.019
Past income 0.190 0.168 0.259 0.133 0.174 0.447
Zero past income 0.276 0.957 0.774 -0.648 0.992 0.513
Future income 0.085 0.098 0.385 0.129 0.101 0.201
Zero future income 0.475 0.435 0.275 0.609 0.450 0.177
Age 0.241*** 0.056 0.000 0.216*** 0.058 0.000
Age2 -0.002*** 0.001 0.004 -0.002** 0.001 0.016
Empl. status
Working Omitted Omitted
Partially retired 0.101 0.214 0.638 0.206 0.221 0.354
Retired 0.269 0.276 0.330 0.255 0.286 0.373
Occupation
Faculty Omitted Omitted
Mgmt./Sen. Admin. -0.100 0.123 0.415 -0.122 0.127 0.338
Tech./Professional 0.095 0.116 0.410 0.088 0.120 0.463
Other -0.124 0.140 0.374 -0.167 0.145 0.249
Education
College or below -0.210* 0.114 0.066 -0.354*** 0.118 0.003
M.A./Profesional Omitted Omitted
Ph.D. -0.143 0.103 0.164 -0.140 0.106 0.189
R. has DB plan -0.153 0.104 0.140 -0.254** 0.107 0.018
S. has DB plan -0.145 0.128 0.258 -0.272** 0.132 0.041
Marital status
Curr. married Omitted Omitted
Prev. married -0.502*** 0.147 0.001 -0.492*** 0.153 0.001
Never married -0.274** 0.133 0.039 -0.152 0.137 0.268
Male respondent -0.019 0.092 0.836 0.056 0.095 0.560
Num. kids 0.053 0.049 0.278 0.030 0.051 0.556
Constant -4.947*** 1.534 0.001 -5.048*** 1.589 0.002
N 500 500
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2000 & 2001 survey data.
Note: Dependent variables are natural logarithms of the quantities listed at head of each set
of columns. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical conﬁdence for rejection of the hypothesis
that the relevant coeﬃcient is (independently) equal to zero: “***” indicates rejection at
better than a 1% level of conﬁdence, “**” indicates rejection at better than a 5% level, and
“*” indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
194.5 Interpretation
How strong is the intuitive argument that questions 3d and 3q are potential instruments
for the wealth-planning relationship? What is most important to us is to rule out reverse
causation, whereby shifts in wealth that occur for reasons that are not controlled for
in our regressions end up correlated with the instruments. It seems very unlikely that
receipt of large wealth transfers is correlated with time spent in planning for a vacation,
especially since the answer to this question is essentially uncorrelated with income. Even
mathematical skills are not highly correlated with income (the correlation in the regres-
sion sample is only 0.09). This makes it almost equally unlikely that mathematical skills
are correlated with high wealth transfers, especially transfers that are uncorrelated with
personal life time income or education, both of which are included on the right-hand side
of the wealth regressions.
While our instruments seem largely eﬀective in ruling out reverse causation, we do
not wish to press the opposite interpretation too far. Our results at this stage do not
establish that exogenous shifts in the propensity to plan give rise to large shifts in wealth.
We do not have any such shifts in planning, since we use diﬀerences across agents rather
than diﬀerences over time to identify planning eﬀects. What our results do suggest is that
higher levels of the propensity to plan are associated with increased wealth accumulation.
The remaining sections explore how this association arises.
4.6 Using TIAA-CREF Accounting Data
We repeat the above analysis substituting TIAA-CREF accounting data for the self-
reported TIAA-CREF data for those households for whom this is not a clearly inappro-
priate substitution. As pointed out in section 2 above, inaccuracies are to be expected
when the household owns a particular type of IRA at TIAA-CREF, and in cases in which
both partners in a household have TIAA-CREF assets and the self-reported data refers
to a diﬀerent individual than does the accounting data. When we rule out these cases,
our sample size falls from 500 to 438.
The change in sample per se makes very little diﬀerence to our results when we use
the self-reported data for wealth and net worth. Yet the results change somewhat when
we replace the self-reported measure of wealth with the accounting data in the net worth
and gross ﬁnancial assets regressions. In particular, there is a reduction in the coeﬃcient
on planning in both the simple OLS regressions and the IV-regressions. The coeﬃcient in
the net worth IV-regression falls to .237, and is signiﬁcant at the 9% level. The coeﬃcient
in the gross ﬁnancial assets IV-regression falls to .217, and is signiﬁcant at the 11% level.
20What accounts for the diﬀerences between the results based on the self-reports and the
results based on the accounting data? To answer this with any degree of conﬁdence, we
would ﬁrst have to know why the two numbers diﬀer. There are at least three candidate
explanations. One candidate is simple random misreporting, in which survey respondents
make random errors in reporting their TIAA-CREF asset total. A second candidate is
miscategorization, in which an error in the reported TIAA-CREF total corresponds to
an equal and opposite error in another asset category.7 A third candidate is that the
accounting data and the self-reported data may refer to diﬀerent dates. On the front of
the survey, it is stated that all asset information should be accurate as of December 31,
1999, and this is the date of the accounting information we use. Yet in the body of the
SPF, respondents were asked to provide the “current value” of their holdings of various
assets. In essence, one might expect answers to this question for each asset to refer
to some recent date, rather than to December 31, 1999. Indeed, given that signiﬁcant
numbers of survey responses were received in February 2000, the actual number may
even be more up-to-date.8
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to sort out which of the above explanations
for the diﬀerence between the self-reports and accounting data is closest to the truth.
Indeed the subject of how self-reports and actual accounting data diﬀer is a fascinating
and important question that warrants additional research in its own right. Given this
underlying complexity, the best that we can do at this stage is to investigate the impact
of planning for those who make the smallest errors, and therefore for whom the ﬁndings
should be less dependent on which source of data we use. Table 8 summarizes the results
of regressions in which we restrict the sample to households for whom the diﬀerence
between self-reported and accounting data is relatively small. Speciﬁcally, the sample
includes only those households for whom this diﬀerence is either under $10,000 in absolute
value, or reﬂects less than a 10% diﬀerence in the TIAA-CREF balance. With this
restriction, diﬀerences larger than 10% are allowed only if they are small in absolute
terms (e.g rounding down from $100 to $0), and large absolute errors are allowed only if
they are small in proportionate terms (e.g. $15,000 of accounts totaling $250,000). This
restriction reduces the sample from 438 to 361 households.
7For example, while the survey makes clear that supplemental retirement assets were to be included
in the total of “employer-sponsored” accounts, it would be easy to understand a miscategorization in
which the respondent treated them instead as IRAs, since there may be no employer contribution in
some types of plans.
8The issue of timing is especially important given the signiﬁcant role of equities in the TIAA-CREF
portfolios of the survey respondents, and the fact that accumulation unit values for the various CREF
equity-based accounts varied from their end-millenium values by some 5%-10% in the weeks surrounding
December 31, 1999.
21As the table shows, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the results using the
accounting as opposed to the self-reported data. The coeﬃcients on planning in these
regressions are very close to the coeﬃcients reported in table 7. In fact, the coeﬃcients in
the net worth regressions are slightly higher than in table 7, and in all four regressions in
table 8, statistical signiﬁcance is at or around the 5% level. In the ﬁrst stage regression
(which is the same for all four of the regressions), the coeﬃcients on question 3d and
question 3q are little changed from their values in the full regression sample, and they
have a joint F statistic of 8.37, signiﬁcant at the .0003 level. Finally, the second stage
regressions underlying table 8 all pass tests of the overidentifying restrictions.
Table 8
Coeﬃcient on IV Planning Variable for Households with
Small Diﬀerences between Self-Reports and Accounting Data
Data Used
Self-Reported Data TIAA-CREF Data
Dependent variable Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t| Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t|
Net Worth 0.368* 0.187 0.050 0.360* 0.185 0.053
Gross Financial Assets 0.357** 0.178 0.046 0.344** 0.173 0.048
N 361 361
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2000 & 2001 survey data.
Note: Coeﬃcients in the table above are for the planning variable in the second stage of an IV regression with
the same speciﬁcation as reported in tables 6 and 7. For brevity, other coeﬃcients are omitted from the table
above, but are included in the underlying regressions. These regressions include only the 361 individuals in the
regression sample whose self-reported age and gender match the accounting data, who have no TIAA-CREF
IRAs, and for whom either: (1) the absolute diﬀerence between self-reported TIAA-CREF balances and the
TIAA-CREF accounting data is $10,000 or less, or (2) the absolute log diﬀerence between self-reported TIAA-
CREF balances and the TIAA-CREF accounting data is .10 log points or less. Asterisks indicate the level of
statistical conﬁdence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coeﬃcient is (independently) equal to
zero: “***” indicates rejection at better than a 1% level of conﬁdence, “**” indicates rejection at better than
a 5% level, and “*” indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
5 Asset Returns or Asset Accumulation?
To arrive at a higher level of wealth, households either must have earned higher returns
on their asset portfolios, or must have accumulated assets at a faster rate. An obvious
candidate for improved asset returns is increased equity holdings, given that wealth is
measured at the end of the long equity boom of the 1990’s. An obvious candidate with
respect to accumulation is the savings rate. In this section, we use survey data to shed
light on the relative importance of these channels.
225.1 Equity Eﬀects
In the HRS, Lusardi ﬁnds evidence that planning increases stock market participation,
and argues that this is a potential reason that planning is associated with wealth accumu-
lation. Stock market participation is only 26% in Lusardi’s HRS sample, and is therefore
a potentially important margin for wealth accumulation. In contrast, well above 90% of
the households in our regression sample own stocks. If we limit our analysis to agents who
own stock, the coeﬃcient on planning is virtually unchanged. Stock market participation
does not appear to explain the planning-wealth correlation in our sample.
Could it be that planners simply hold more stocks and that the dramatic rise in
stock prices explains the increased wealth? The answer is no. On average stocks make
up approximately 63% of ﬁnancial assets in our regression sample. Even those who
report low planning levels have 60% of their ﬁnancial wealth in equities. If we regress
the share of stocks in ﬁnancial assets on instrumented planning and controls, planning
is insigniﬁcant. Finally, if planning aﬀected wealth through stock holding, we might
expect including stock holding in the planning regression to reduce the eﬀect of planning
on wealth. We therefore included stock holding in the IV planning regressions. While
the stock share is positively correlated with net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets, the
coeﬃcient on planning remains essentially unchanged in both regressions. In our sample,
stock holding does not appear to explain the eﬀect of planning on wealth.
5.2 Planning and Saving
The correct economic deﬁnition of income includes all income from assets including capi-
tal gains, as well as employer contributions to pension plans. Yet this is not the common
sense deﬁnition of income. Consumption and expenditure are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent,
especially when there are large purchases of durable goods. The end result is that saving
(the diﬀerence between income and consumption) is very diﬃcult to measure in a survey
with any degree of accuracy. Our approach was to ask a straightforward question relat-
ing to income from employment in comparison with expenditures, and then to use our
other data to try to make appropriate adjustments. We asked households the following
question:
• Question 13: On average over the past ﬁve years has your total household
spending (i.e. all spending including debt or mortgage payments) been more or
less than the after tax income that your household has received from employment?
(In other words, did you spend more than your income from employment and rely
23on other ﬁnancial assets to cover your household spending, or did you spend less
and rely solely on your employment income?)
Of the households in the universe who answered this question, 63% reported that income
exceeded spending, 21% reported that spending exceeded income, while the remaining
16% reported income equal to expenditure.
Our interest is in whether the propensity to plan appears to play a signiﬁcant role in
determining the qualitative answer to this question. In a ﬁrst cut, we include the same
controls as in the wealth regressions. The sample expands to 915 due to the fact that we
no longer require a comprehensive measure of wealth. The coeﬃcient on instrumented
planning is positive in this regression, and signiﬁcant at the 3% level. Those with a high
propensity to plan are more likely to be saving in the sense of question 13.
To investigate whether or not this ﬁnding applies to a more appropriate economic
deﬁnition of saving, we use our survey data to construct new variables that enable us
to get closer to the correct deﬁnition. The exclusion of asset income and employer
contributions from income as deﬁned in question 13 suggests that our savings regression
will be more appropriate when we include these two variables on the right hand side. We
measure income from assets using data from the SPF which distinguishes income from
employment, income from savings and investments, income from rental properties, as
well as income from all forms of pension (unfortunately, we have no measure of capital
gains). We measure employer contributions to all deﬁned contribution pension plans as
a proportion of employment income directly from the SPF. Finally, question 13 instructs
households to include all mortgage payments in spending, yet the repayment of principal
should be counted in savings. Since we do not have a breakdown of mortgage payments
between principal and interest, we do the next best thing and use the SPF to measure the
ratio of total mortgage payments to income from employment. When we include these
three constructed variables and the controls together with instrumented planning in our
savings regression, the sample shrinks to only 321 households. However, the coeﬃcient
on instrumented planning remains positive (it is actually higher in this regression than
in the larger regression), and is signiﬁcant at the 6% level.
6 Planning and Preference Parameters
From the viewpoint of the life cycle model, the positive association between planning,
savings, and wealth accumulation is most readily explained if there is a strong correlation
between the propensity to plan and parameters in the classical model that motivate high
24levels of saving. The most obvious candidate is the discount factor. Even though it is not
obvious why our instruments should be correlated with the discount rate, it is possible
that agents who care more about the future may be natural planners. It is therefore the
correlation between discounting and the propensity to plan that is the subject of the bulk
of this section. In the remainder of the section we turn to other preference parameters
that were measured in our survey, in particular the bequest motive, and explore their
impact on the planning-savings relationship.
6.1 Planning and Patience
In order to assess the relationship between planning and discounting, we attempted to
measure the discount factors of our agents. Our questions on discounting were variants
of the hypothetical choice questions introduced by BJKS:
• Question 10. Suppose that you (and your spouse/partner, if applicable) are cur-
rently 50 years old, and that you are certain you (both) will live to be exactly
80 years old. We are interested in how you would like to allocate your total life-
time resources (savings, income and other ﬁnancial resources), depending on your
assumptions about retirement. Assume that any resources you do not spend are
held as cash, and therefore do not grow in value over time. Assume also that there
is no inﬂation, and any medical expenses you may have will be fully covered by
insurance.
– In the boxes below, please indicate what proportion of your total lifetime
resources (saving, income and other ﬁnancial resources) you would like to
devote to:
∗ 1) Spending during the time from age 50 to age 64.
∗ 2) Spending during the time from age 65 to age 79.
∗ 3) A bequest or inheritance to your heirs of other beneﬁciaries.
Respondents were asked to consider two scenarios: one in which they retire at age 65
and one in which they never retire. For each scenario they were asked to enter a number
from 0% to a 100% for spending during ages 50-64, spending during ages 65-79, and for
a bequest. They were prompted to make sure that the numbers totaled 100%.9 It turns
9There are two diﬀerences between this question and that asked by BJKS. First, they ask respondents
to allocate resources between two period of life, whereas we allow the additional option of a bequest.
Second, we condition the answers on whether or not the respondent retires at age 65 in the hypothetical
scenario, whereas they consider only the case of retirement.
25out that conditioning on retirement has little impact on the answers. We therefore chose
to work with the version of the question in which agents were asked to imagine retirement
at 65.
We construct the variable “preference for future consumption” by dividing the per-
centage of resources allocated to the later period of life by the percentage of resources
not allocated to bequests. This variable is a measure of the desire to shift consumption
to the future. All else equal, a higher value is associated with a lower discount rate or
a higher discount factor. Before working with this variable, we ﬁrst eliminate responses
in which one of these was unreasonably close to zero.10 When we ﬁlter in this way, our
universe is reduced to 720 individuals. Within this group the mean value almost exactly
0.5, indicating a general preference for equal consumption in the two life periods (in
fact more than 40% of respondents allocate a precisely equal amount to the two periods
of life). The standard deviation of these responses is .076, so that there is substantial
variation around this happy medium.
Do those in our sample who have a higher preference for future consumption plan
more? The answer is deﬁnitively not. In fact, the raw correlation between this preference
and planning in the regression sample is negative. Even when we regress preference for
future consumption on instrumented planning and the controls, the coeﬃcient on plan-
ning is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Not only is preference for future consumption
orthogonal to the propensity to plan, it also appears to be orthogonal to wealth accumu-
lation. When we include it in any of our instrumental variables regressions of wealth on
planning, it is close to zero and insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient on planning is essentially
unchanged by its inclusion.
The low explanatory power of our measure of preference for future consumption sug-
gests that ﬁnding a direct, theoretically-inspired question to assess the discount factor is
a serious challenge. It is in fact possible that the propensity to plan is a better measure
of the underlying discount factor than are the direct questions we posed. Unfortunately
this hypothesis is not easily tested.
6.2 Other Preference Parameters
We investigate the relationship between the propensity to plan and other preference
parameters that may aﬀect wealth accumulation. In particular, we consider risk aver-
10Some respondents literally allocated zero resources to one of the two periods of life, suggesting that
they had diﬃculty in understanding the question. Others put in tiny positive numbers. We eliminated
all observations in which the allocation to either period of life was less than 25%. Our irrelevance results
survive no matter what cutoﬀ we choose.
26sion, the precautionary savings motive, and the bequest motive. The bequest motive
is measured using the quantitative answer to question 10 above. Qualitative and quan-
titative measures of the precautionary motive and of risk aversion are described in the
Appendix. In no case do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship with the propensity to plan,
and in no case does the inclusion of these preference parameters signiﬁcantly impact the
relationship between instrumented planning and net worth.
7 Budgeting and Wealth Accumulation
In this section we follow up on the story presented in the introduction, and explore
whether or not the ability to closely monitor and to tightly control short-term spending
is enhanced by the propensity to plan. The results are aﬃrmative, suggesting that this
is at least part of the story.
7.1 Budgeting and Planning
In order to measure ﬁnancial monitoring behaviors, respondents were asked to respond,
using the previously described 1 to 6 scale of agreement, to the following statement on
their budgeting behavior:
• Question 3i: My household regularly sets a detailed budget for our overall spending.
Budgeting is less prevalent in our regression sample than is ﬁnancial planning. Roughly
40% of sample households agree to any degree that they keep a budget, while the rest
disagree. In contrast 65% agreed to some degree that they had spent a great deal of time
developing a ﬁnancial plan.
While far from identical, there is nevertheless a strong relationship between budgeting
and planning. The correlation between the answers to the two questions is 0.3. This close
relationship becomes far closer when one relates budgeting to the propensity to plan. In a
regression of budgeting on instrumented planning and our other controls in the under-65
universe, the coeﬃcient on instrumented planning is 1.12 with a standard error of .213.
When the propensity to plan increases, it has even greater impact on budgeting than it
does on planning itself.
7.2 Budgeting and Wealth Accumulation
The same logic that led us to the selection of our planning instruments applies in the case
of budgeting. Both activities require numeracy and a generalized tendency to plan. In
27this section we explore similarities and diﬀerences in the impact of instrumented planning
and instrumented budgeting on wealth accumulation.
The big diﬀerence is that in reduced form regressions, there is a negative relationship
between the budgeting variable and both net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets (in both
cases, there is signiﬁcance at better than a 10% level). This is quite the opposite of the
ﬁndings with ﬁnancial planning. Controlling for other factors, higher levels of wealth are
associated with lower levels of budgeting. However, when we consider an instrumented
version of budgeting, the instrumental variables regression actually indicates a positive
relationship between wealth and the instrumented budgeting variable. Table 9 presents
the results of an IV-regression of net worth and gross ﬁnancial assets on budgeting, using
the measures of tendency to plan vacations (question 3d) and math conﬁdence (question
3q) as instruments. In both ﬁrst stage regressions, the F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance
of the instruments is above 13.
While these coeﬃcients and their signiﬁcance are lower than in the planning regres-
sion, the results are perhaps more surprising in light of the negative association between
budgeting and wealth in the OLS reduced form regression. In fact, when we limit at-
tention to those households with net worth between $50,000 and $750,000, the eﬀect of
instrumented budgeting on net worth is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and that on gross
ﬁnancial assets is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This suggests that our instruments are
doing more than simply reducing measurement error in budgeting. In fact, the results
suggest that the feedback eﬀect from wealth to budgeting is negative, possibly because
those who are exogenously wealthier may not need to watch their spending so closely.
Finally, when we replace instrumented planning with instrumented budgeting in the sav-
ings regression of section 5.2, the coeﬃcients and their statistical signiﬁcance change only
marginally. Those who budget carefully because they have a higher propensity to plan
appear also to save more.
Just as with planning, we cannot insist on a causal interpretation. Budgeters may
save more either because budgeting itself promotes saving, or because the type of people
who budget tend to be savers. We therefore look for additional direct evidence on the
link between budgeting behaviors and savings.
28Table 9
Second-stage Budgeting/Wealth Regression Results
Net Worth Gross Financial Assets
Variable Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t| Coeﬀ. S.E. Pr > |t|
Budgeting variable (IV) 0.209 0.146 0.154 0.277* 0.154 0.072
Log 1999 income 0.348** 0.175 0.048 0.409** 0.185 0.028
Zero 1999 income 1.973** 0.892 0.027 2.375** 0.941 0.012
Past income 0.257 0.173 0.138 0.210 0.183 0.250
Zero past income 0.902 0.966 0.351 0.111 1.019 0.913
Future income 0.104 0.110 0.341 0.157 0.116 0.176
Zero future income 0.613 0.495 0.217 0.794 0.523 0.129
Age 0.181*** 0.052 0.001 0.144** 0.055 0.010
Age2 -0.001* 0.001 0.052 -0.001 0.001 0.241
Empl. status
Working Omitted Omitted
Partially retired 0.221 0.217 0.310 0.349 0.229 0.129
Retired 0.178 0.322 0.580 0.122 0.340 0.720
Occupation
Faculty Omitted Omitted
Mgmt./Sen. Admin. -0.118 0.133 0.377 -0.149 0.141 0.292
Tech./Professional 0.108 0.126 0.391 0.109 0.133 0.413
Other -0.124 0.150 0.411 -0.169 0.159 0.288
Education
College or below -0.164 0.122 0.181 -0.293** 0.129 0.024
M.A./Profesional Omitted Omitted
Ph.D. -0.127 0.112 0.258 -0.114 0.118 0.335
R. has DB plan -0.127 0.111 0.250 -0.228* 0.117 0.051
S. has DB plan -0.154 0.139 0.268 -0.287* 0.146 0.050
Marital status
Curr. married Omitted Omitted
Prev. married -0.507*** 0.158 0.001 -0.497*** 0.166 0.003
Never married -0.300** 0.140 0.033 -0.185 0.148 0.212
Male respondent 0.054 0.106 0.610 0.154 0.112 0.171
Num. kids 0.056 0.053 0.291 0.035 0.056 0.528
Constant -3.673*** 1.376 0.008 -3.592** 1.452 0.014
N 500 500
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2000 & 2001 survey data.
Note: Dependent variables are natural logarithms of the quantities listed at head of each set
of columns. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical conﬁdence for rejection of the hypothesis
that the relevant coeﬃcient is (independently) equal to zero: “***” indicates rejection at
better than a 1% level of conﬁdence, “**” indicates rejection at better than a 5% level, and
“*” indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
297.3 A Direct Question
Given our belief in the potential importance of short-term budgeting as a restraining
inﬂuence on spending, we designed survey questions to directly explore whether or not
the story of the introduction was an isolated case. In particular we asked a direct question
on whether households who kept a budget felt that this activity signiﬁcantly reduced their
spending.
• Question 3j: If my household were to never set a budget, our spending would rise
a great deal.
It was up to the respondents themselves to decide whether or not they set a budget and
hence should respond to the question. Of particular interest are the responses to question
3j for the 37% of sample households whose responses to question 3i were 4 or above (i.e.
those who agreed at least to some extent that they set a detailed spending budget).
These responses reveal an even split, with almost 50% of responses indicating some
form of agreement: 6% agreeing strongly, 15% unequivocally agreeing, and 24% agreeing
only somewhat. A substantial minority of sample households agree that their budgeting
activities help them to restrain their spending. Our close friend of the introduction is
not alone in ﬁnding budgeting a useful technique for controlling spending.
8 Concluding Remarks
We derive strong new results on the nature of the relationship between ﬁnancial planning
and wealth accumulation. The strength of our ﬁndings derives in large part from a series
of survey questions that were explicitly designed to act as instruments in identifying
causality. We believe that increased use of such “designer instruments” will prove useful
in identifying the direction of causation in other areas of macroeconomics, and beyond.
Our particular ﬁndings concerning the importance of the propensity to plan in the
process of wealth accumulation suggest several new directions for future research. What
combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors determine the propensity to plan? Should
policy makers interested in encouraging savings push educational programs intended to
build planning skills? How much does budgeting behavior inﬂuence the savings rate, and
how does this connect to classical models of the discount factor, and of self control?
The propensity to plan may be signiﬁcant not only as an indicator of potential wealth
accumulation, but also of ﬁnancial inertia. The results of Ameriks and Zeldes [2002] and
Madrian and Shea [2001] both highlight the importance of inertia in changing portfolio
30allocations. Preliminary investigations using our survey data suggest that those with
a low propensity to plan not only fail to monitor their spending, but also are more
ﬁnancially inert. Precisely how this relationship works and how it may feed back onto
the process of wealth accumulation itself are important open questions.
9 Appendix
9.1 Risk Aversion
Our question on risk aversion is a variant of that of BJKS:
• Question 6. Suppose you have a choice between a certain and an uncertain path
for your future household income. Your options are either (A) or (B) below.
– (A) Your household income rises immediately and permanently by 25% from
its current level.
– (B) There is an equal chance that each of the following outcomes will occur:
∗ B-1. Your household income decreases immediately and permanently by
33% (to two-thirds of its current level), or
∗ B-2. Your household income increases immediately and permanently by
100% (to twice its current level).
In answer to this question, they could either state a preference for A or B, or state
that they had no preference. We followed up this qualitative question with a further
quantitative question designed to reﬁne the measure of risk aversion.
9.2 Precautionary Savings
Our measure of the precautionary motive is as follows:
• Question 8. Suppose that you [and your spouse/partner] are 50 years old, and have a
ﬁxed, annual after tax income of $50,000, which you expect to continue indeﬁnitely.
Assume also that you have paid oﬀ any debts (including your mortgage) and have
no other signiﬁcant ﬁnancial obligations. All of a sudden you become aware of an
increase in income uncertainty: in one year’s time your annual after-tax income
will change permanently to either $60,000 or $40,000, with a 50-50 chance of either
outcome. How would this news impact your total level of savings our of this year’s
income of $50,000?
31– I would save more
– I would save less
– I would not change my level of savings
Again, we followed up this qualitative question with a further quantitative question
designed to reﬁne the answer.
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